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Abstract 
The deterioration of the global fiscal sustainability emphasized the interest of academics and policy makers for this topic. Thus, 
in this article, the aim is to highlight the need for analysis of fiscal sustainability challenges through the evaluation path, 
identification of benchmark tax burden indicators, shocks definition and their transmission mechanism, trajectory analysis of the 
benchmark indicators under a baseline and alternative scenarios given the macroeconomic risks that may arise in terms of applied 
monetary and fiscal policies. The entire analysis will start from the debt evaluation by three criteria: solvency, liquidity and 
realistic adjustment criteria. The first one implies compliance with the intertemporal budget constraint, government’s ability to 
pay the debt without renegotiation or default and that the tax burden indicators are designed either to stabilize or reduce both 
under a baseline scenario or alternative scenarios. The second one considers that there is sufficient funding and liquid assets to 
meet obligations when due, that the level and trajectory of tax burden indicators continuously facilitate market access, the debt 
roll over risk is low and the debt profile is balanced in terms of maturity, currency composition and investment base. The last one 
is based on realistic assumptions and projections in terms of macroeconomic adjustment in the primary balance, meaning that the 
adjustment is economically and politically feasible. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and/ peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crises manifested during the last years at a global level revealed some weaknesses regarding 
the management of economic policies. During this period, the advanced economies were the most affected countries 
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as according to Laeven and Valencia (2012), these economies had larger output losses and increases of the public 
debt than the emerging economies. These findings are strengthened by Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012), as a higher 
level of financial deepening and larger current account imbalances characterize the advanced economies. The data 
reveal the same idea, as we can see in Table 1. There are countries that registered large increases in the public debt 
with more than 60% of GDP and countries that do not breaks this convergence criterion, but the growth rate of the 
debt became increasingly more.  
Table 1. The evolution of government consolidated gross debt in EU (% of GDP) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Belgium 86,9 92,2 99,3 99,6 102,1 104,0 104,5 
Bulgaria 16,6 13,3 14,2 15,9 15,7 18,0 18,3 
Czech Republic 27,8 28,7 34,1 38,2 41,0 45,5 45,7 
Denmark 27,3 33,4 40,4 42,9 46,4 45,6 45,0 
Germany  63,5 64,9 72,4 80,3 77,6 79,0 76,9 
Estonia : : : 6,5 6,0 9,7 10,1 
Ireland 24,0 42,6 62,2 87,4 111,1 121,7 123,3 
Greece 103,1 109,3 126,8 146,0 171,3 156,9 174,9 
Spain 35,5 39,4 52,7 60,1 69,2 84,4 92,1 
France 64,2 67,8 78,8 81,5 85,0 89,2 92,2 
Croatia 34,4 36,0 44,5 52,8 59,9 64,4 75,7 
Italy 99,7 102,3 112,5 115,3 116,4 122,2 127,9 
Cyprus 53,7 44,7 53,5 56,5 66,0 79,5 102,2 
Latvia 8,4 18,6 36,4 46,8 42,7 40,9 38,2 
Lithuania 16,7 15,4 29,0 36,3 37,3 39,9 39,0 
Luxembourg 7,2 14,4 15,5 19,6 18,5 21,4 23,6 
Hungary 65,9 71,9 78,2 80,9 81,0 78,5 77,3 
Malta 62,4 62,7 67,8 67,6 69,8 67,9 69,8 
Netherlands 42,7 54,8 56,5 59,0 61,3 66,5 68,6 
Austria 64,8 68,5 79,7 82,4 82,1 81,7 81,2 
Poland : : : 53,6 54,8 54,4 55,7 
Portugal 68,4 71,7 83,6 96,2 111,1 124,8 128,0 
Romania 12,7 13,2 23,2 29,9 34,2 37,3 37,9 
Slovenia 22,7 21,6 34,5 37,9 46,2 53,4 70,4 
Slovakia 29,8 28,2 36,0 41,1 43,5 52,1 54,6 
Finland 34,0 32,7 41,7 47,1 48,5 53,0 56,0 
Sweden 38,2 36,8 40,3 36,7 36,1 36,4 38,6 
United Kingdom 43,6 51,6 65,9 76,4 81,9 85,8 87,2 
Source: Eurostat 
Thus, in this article we want to emphasize the need of analyzing fiscal sustainability challenges in order to better 
evaluate the debt through three criteria: solvency, liquidity and realistic adjustment criteria. The first one implies 
compliance with the intertemporal budget constraint, government’s ability to pay the debt without renegotiation or 
default and that the tax burden indicators are designed either to stabilize or reduce both under a baseline scenario or 
alternative scenarios. The second one considers that there is sufficient funding and liquid assets to meet obligations 
when due, that the level and trajectory of tax burden indicators continuously facilitate market access, the debt roll 
over risk is low and the debt profile is balanced in terms of maturity, currency composition and investment base. 
The last one is based on realistic assumptions and projections in terms of macroeconomic adjustment in the primary 
balance, meaning that the adjustment is economically and politically feasible. 
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2. Major challenges of the public finance sustainability 
The major challenges of the public finance sustainability consist of creating independent fiscal institutions, fiscal 
responsibility laws, fiscal rules and the management of fiscal risks.  
According to OECD (2013), in the mid-1990s, academic economists floated the idea that countries could adapt 
some of the good experiences of independent central banking to the fiscal sphere, but only due to the recent financial 
crisis when the government deficits and debts increased very much, as one can see in the table above, a growing 
number of countries decided to create independent fiscal institutions, typically referred to as fiscal councils or 
parliamentary budget offices. The independent fiscal institutions are defined by the European Commission (2014) as 
non partisan public bodies, other than the central bank, government or parliament that prepare macroeconomic 
forecasts for the budget, monitor fiscal performance and/or advise the government on fiscal policy matters, being 
only facilitators of sound fiscal public finances, not decision makers deliberately insulated from politics, so they do 
not have the discretion to set policy instruments. 
 These institutions are primarily financed by public funds and are functionally independent vis-à-vis fiscal 
authorities. Courts of Auditors are included in this definition if their activities go beyond the accounting control and 
cover any of the tasks mentioned above. Even if they are very different in terms of roles, resources and structures, 
these institutions tend to share a mandate enshrined in legislation, a “watchdog” role implying a direct contribution 
to the public debate on fiscal policy and strict non-partisanship in their activities (IMF, 2013).  
With the creation of these councils, governments are seeking to reinforce fiscal rules that had proved inadequate 
on their own to ensure prudent management of public finances, as well as signal their commitment to act virtuously 
after the crisis, as in the European Union, new regulations require member states to have independent bodies in 
order to monitor compliance with fiscal rules and produce or endorse macroeconomic forecasts (OECD, 2013). In 
particular, fiscal institutions can provide macroeconomic forecasts for the budget preparation that do not suffer from 
the optimistic biases often found in official government forecasts; they may impartially monitor the implementation 
of budget plans and the respect of budgetary objectives; they may raise awareness about short and long-term costs 
and benefits of budgetary measures both among policy-makers and the public, and finally they can assess whether 
fiscal measures are appropriate in terms of respect of rules, sustainability of public finances, and stability-oriented 
fiscal policies (European Commission, 2014).  
So, in a number of EU Member States these institutions (also called fiscal councils) have proved to be 
instrumental in improving fiscal policy making by providing positive and/or normative analysis, assessments, and 
recommendations in the area of fiscal policy. The majority of fiscal councils have the following activities: 
x Monitor fiscal performance (by checking compliance with the fiscal rules, assessing the efficiency of 
taxation) 
x Advise the government on fiscal policy matters (by publishing opinions and recommendations on fiscal 
policy) 
x Analyse the stance of the fiscal policy, both ex post by comparing the realities with the assumed targets 
and ex ante by evaluating the impact of fiscal policy measures to be implemented. 
Only very few of them realize independent macroeconomic forecasts, such as the Government Debt Committee 
from Austria, Danish Economic Council from Denmark, German Council of Economic Experts from Germany, 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis from Netherlands and Office for Budget Responsibility from 
United Kingdom. 
     The fiscal councils are usually created under Fiscal Responsibility Laws that include explicit guarantees on their 
independence. The role of Fiscal Responsibility Laws is to strengthen fiscal discipline, to improve medium term 
fiscal planning, to prioritize expenditures/ efficient management of public finances (by the fiscal rules) and to 
promote transparency and sustainability of public finances. 
In addition, countries often use fiscal councils in combination with fiscal policy rules, not as a substitute to them. 
The numerical fiscal rules are, in line with European Commission (2014) definition, numerical targets for budgetary 
aggregates as they pose a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal 
outcomes, such as the government budget balance, debt, expenditure, or revenue developments. For example, these 
rules could be (Fiscal Responsibility Law no 69/2010): 
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x The medium-term budgetary objective does not exceed a lower limit of the annual structural balance of 
the public administration of -0.5% of GDP expressed at market prices. 
x The general consolidated budget balance and personnel expenditure of the general consolidated budget 
(% of GDP) may not exceed the annual ceilings established in the fiscal framework of the fiscal strategy 
for the next 2 years. 
x Rules regarding limits of public debt (if the public debt is higher than 50% and lower than 55%, the 
government shall freeze the total expenditures for public wages). 
While the first primary objective of fiscal rules is to enhance budgetary discipline, they can also foster policy 
coordination between different levels of government depending on their institutional coverage. Additionally, fiscal 
rules may further contribute to the reduction of uncertainty about future fiscal policy developments. However, fiscal 
rules can only yield these benefits if appropriate institutions for monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are in 
place, or if they are supported by strong political commitment (European Commission, 2014). 
Finally, the last but not least challenge consists of the management of fiscal risks. According to Cebotari (2009), 
fiscal risks are deviations of fiscal outcomes from what was expected at the time of the budget or other forecast, 
arising from macroeconomic shocks and the realization of contingent liabilities. In other words, usually the budget 
execution is different from fiscal projections, due to several shocks such as deviations of the economic growth from 
the expectations, natural disasters, and unexpected legal claims on the state or government guarantees.  
Moreover, fiscal risks can be either as a form of macroeconomic shocks (interest rate, exchange rate, economic 
growth), either as a form of contingent liabilities, which are obligations caused by an uncertain event. These 
contingent liabilities can be explicit, that are defined by law or contract and implicit, being moral or expected 
obligations for the government, based on the public pressures, such as bailouts of banks or public sector entities 
(Cebotari, 2009).  
The biggest challenge regarding contingent liabilities is that it is very difficult to forecast them and to quantify 
them. This is why, in many cases, the failure to forecast them in order to prepare for such risks caused additional 
government obligations, larger public debts and sometimes, refinancing difficulties and crises.  In order to be able to 
create an image about the probability of confronting with contingent liabilities, one should pay attention to different 
debt burden indicators as measures of solvency and liquidity. Usually, ratios of debt stock relative to repayment 
capacity are indicators of solvency, ratios of debt service are indicators of potential liquidity problems and gross 
financing needs (the amount of financing necessary to cover the deficit plus the amortization of debt) is an indicator 
of potential liquidity problems. Sometimes, it can be difficult to distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity 
situations, as liquidity problems are often symptoms of underlying solvency problems: creditors refuse to roll over 
maturing debt because of solvency concerns and liquidity problems may give rise to insolvency, by raising interest 
rates or pressuring the exchange rate.  
Offering information to the public about the fiscal risks can help to manage risks, to improve economic efficiency 
and to reduce borrowing costs. Making information on fiscal risks publicly available reduces the informational 
asymmetry, helping to ensure that risks are properly assessed and recognized. Moreover, to enhance fiscal 
transparency, IMF published in 2014 an updated version of the "Fiscal Transparency Code" due to the lessons 
learned in the global financial crisis from 2008-2009, having an increased focus on the information needed to 
increase the effectiveness of fiscal management and supervision. The analyze regarding the fiscal risk disclosure 
recommends the government to report on how fiscal outcomes might differ from baseline forecasts, to provide a 
regular summary report on the main specific risks to its fiscal forecasts and to regularly publish projections of the 
public finance over the long term (IMF, 2014). Regarding the management of the fiscal risks, the Code recommends 
that: 
x the budget has transparent and adequate allocations for contingencies that arise during budget execution; 
x the risks related to major assets and liabilities are disclosed and managed; 
x the government's guarantee exposure is regularly disclosed and authorized by law; 
x obligations under public-private partnerships are regularly disclosed and actively managed; 
x the government's potential fiscal exposure to the financial sector is analyzed, disclosed and managed; 
x the government's interest in exhaustible natural resource assets and their exploitation is valued, disclosed and 
managed.  
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3. Conclusions 
In conclusion, we could observe that larger output losses and increases of the public debt manifested during 
financial turmoil increased the need of better analyze the public finance sustainability, starting from the solvency 
and liquidity criteria used in the debt evaluation and continuing with the major challenges of the fiscal sustainability. 
Thus, we highlighted the importance of having independent fiscal institutions created under Fiscal Responsibility 
Law and completed by fiscal rules and by a better management of fiscal risks.   
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